Person-level assessment of measurement invariance

Quality & Quantity - Existing procedures for testing measurement invariance focus mainly on group-level comparisons rather than individual comparisons (i.e., the main conclusion typically...     

The Business Value of Process Flexibility

Promising to cope with increasing demand variety and uncertainty, flexibility in general and process flexibility in particular are becoming ever more desired corporate capabilities. During the last years, the business process management and the production/operations management communities have proposed numerous approaches that investigate how to valuate and determine an appropriate level of process flexibility. Most of these approaches are very restrictive regarding their application domain, neglect characteristics of the involved processes and outputs other than demand and capacity, and do not conduct a thorough economic analysis of process flexibility. Against this backdrop, the authors propose an optimization model that determines an appropriate level of process flexibility in line with the principles of value-based business process management. The model includes demand uncertainty, variability, criticality, and similarity as process characteristics. The paper also reports on the insights gained from applying the optimization model to the coverage switching processes of an insurance broker pool company.     

Union Involvement in Workplace Change: A Comparative Study of Local Unions in Canada and Mexico

This paper examines the sources of local union power to cope with workplace change. Are workplace unions active participants, merely passengers, outright opponents, or entirely excluded from the change process? Drawing on 18 case studies and a survey conducted in the auto and metalworking industries in Mexico and Canada, the results suggest that greater internal solidarity, stronger articulation with other levels of union and community activity and the pursuit of an autonomous agenda all provide the basis for enhanced local union bargaining power in the context of globalization. This general conclusion applies to Canadian as well as Mexican local unions and suggests analytical paths for understanding the construction and renewal of union power.     

Transfer problem dynamics: Macroeconomics of the Franco-Prussian war indemnity

We study the classic transfer problem using the largest historical example, the Franco-Prussian War indemnity of 1871-1873 which saw France transfer to Germany 25% of a year's GDP. A dynamic, two-country model allows for debt finance, supply-side effects, and controls for wartime spending. The model can fit the historical paths of French net exports and the terms of trade. But explaining French output and consumption requires additional shocks. These results illustrate the usefulness of the DSGE approach to the transfer problem and provide striking evidence of the importance of international capital markets in the 19th century.     

Pooling forecasts in linear rational expectations models

Estimating linear rational expectations models in a limited-information setting requires replacing the expectations of future, endogenous variables either with instrumented, actual values or with forecast survey data. Applying the method of Gottfries and Persson [Empirical examinations of the information sets of economic agents. Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 251–259], I show how to augment these methods with actual, future values of the endogenous variables to improve statistical efficiency. The method is illustrated with an application to the US hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve, where traditional, lagged instruments and the median forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters both appear to miss significant information used by price-setters, so that forecast pooling with actual values improves the statistical fit to inflation.     

Real exchange rates, preferences, and incomplete markets: evidence, 1961–2001

Abstract.  Many international macroeconomic models link the real exchange rate to a ratio of marginal utilities. We examine this link empirically, allowing the marginal utility of consumption to depend on government expenditure, real money balances, or external habit. We also consider two environments with incomplete asset markets; one with exogenously missing markets but an endogenous discount rate that anchors the distribution of wealth and one with endogenous market segmentation. Although none of these satisfies theoretical and over‐identifying restrictions for every country, utility with external habit persistence provides the best match with real exchange rates for OECD countries between 1961 and 2001. JEL classification: F41     

Comparing survey data with an official administrative population: assessing sample-selectivity in the IAB Establishment Panel

The IAB Establishment Panel is a large annual establishment survey and serves as a data source for many empirical analyzes, e.g., on labor demand, wages and industrial relations but also for influential policy evaluations. We analyze the selectivity of the IAB Establishment Panel compared with the administrative population of all establishments in Germany to test whether the IAB Establishment Panel is biased towards “good employers”. By design the survey over-samples large, thus high paying and stable establishments. After flexibly controlling for elements of the sampling design, we do not detect any meaningful difference between establishments participating in the survey and the full population regarding key economic performance indicators. If anything, we observe a slight overrepresentation of stable and slow growing establishments. For applied research, the results highlight that “typical” econometric specifications may not be sufficient to control for selectivity.

     

Tullock's Puzzle in Pay‐and‐Play Lobbying

We explain Tullock's puzzle of small payments from special interests to policy‐makers by the hold‐up problem between the two parties. We construct a simple lobbying environment where an uninformed policy‐maker is a price‐setter who sells access to two opposed and privately informed lobbyists. The key equilibrium property is “the curse of the ex ante favored lobbyist”; the lobbyist proposing a project with the higher expected public value ends up worse off than the lobbyist proposing a project with the lower expected public value. In the absence of contribution caps, the ex ante favored lobbyist strategically devalues her project, and the resulting competitive devaluations destroy private values, revenues, as well as correlated public values. Ex ante, the policy‐maker benefits from a binding contribution cap protects the ex ante favored lobbyist, eliminates competitive devaluations, and thus remedies the hold‐up problem.